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Abstract
Having positive moral traits is central to one’s sense of self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a positive view of the
self in the present. But it remains unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of the self in the present. We suggest
that recollecting and reflecting onmoral and immoral actions from the personal past jointly help to construct a morally good view
of the current self in complementary ways. More specifically, across four studies we investigated the extent to which people
believe they have changed over time after recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the personal past. Our results
indicate that recollecting past immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of dissimilarity and change in the sense of
self over time than recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty,
helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting for objective, calendar
time. Further supporting a motivational explanation, these effects held when people recollected their own past actions but not
when they recollected the actions of other people.
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Introduction
A critical function of remembering the personal past is to con-
struct a sense of self: remembering events from the past informs
who we are and who we wish to be (Bluck, 2003; Conway,
2005; Fivush, Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011; McAdams,
2013; Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009). But the person we believe
ourselves to be in the present influences which events we read-
ily recall, how we recall those events, and how we come to
interpret the significance of those events (Conway, 2005;
Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1989; Wilson & Ross, 2003). At least
in Western cultures, most people are motivated to maintain a
positive view of themselves in the present (Alicke & Sedikides,
2009; Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides, 1993). Systematic biases
and distortions in recollecting specific past events and in
constructing a life narrative help to maintain, enhance, and pro-
tect this positive view of the self.
In certain contexts, people construct a positive view of the
self in the present by readily and selectively recalling past
behaviors that showcase their positive traits and qualities
(Markus & Wurf, 1987; Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker,
2007; Ross, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). In one
line of research, experimenters led participants to believe that
either extroverts or introverts tend to be more successful
(Kunda, Fong, Sanitioso, & Reber, 1993; Kunda &
Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, Fong, 1990). Those led
to believe that extroversion is conducive to success more read-
ily recalled past events showcasing their extroversion relative
to those led to believe that introversion is conducive to suc-
cess. Other research has indicated that people tend to prefer-
entially forget negative feedback about themselves, particular-
ly when that negative feedback is about something of personal
importance (Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004; Sedikides &
Green, 2000). Importantly, those with the strongest motiva-
tions to view themselves positively are most likely to interpret
their positive experiences as characteristic of a stable sense of
self that persists over time (Kunda, 1990; Wilson & Ross,
2003). For instance, a person strongly motivated to believe
she is intelligent might selectively seek out, readily accept,
and successfully retain information substantiating this positive
view of herself as intelligent. She might then easily and
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frequently recall events from her personal past that support
this view of herself, and those recollections would strengthen
the belief that she currently is, and steadfastly has been, an
intelligent person. In this way, autobiographical memories fa-
cilitate impressions of similarity (or consistency) over time in
service of fostering a favorable view of the self.
The readiness with which we recall events showcasing our
positive traits does not imply that we are more likely to forget
experiences that portray the self negatively (Stanley, Yang, &
De Brigard, 2018). When confronted by our own past short-
comings and failures, it is still possible to achieve a positive
view of the self in the present by constructing a life narrative in
which negative experiences represent turning points or indi-
cations of self-improvement over time (Conway, 2005; Libby
& Eibach, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Individuals compare
their current selves to their past selves to perceive positive
change and improvement over time, which, in turn, helps to
maintain, or even to enhance, a favorable view of the current
self (Demiray & Janssen, 2015; Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock,
& von Hecker, 2008; Ross & Wilson, 2003). For example,
Wilson and Ross (2000) manipulated the objectives of partic-
ipants when instructing them to describe themselves: some
were encouraged to adopt the goal of evaluating themselves
favorably, and others were encouraged to evaluate themselves
accurately. Participants instructed to evaluate themselves
favorably were more likely to describe inferior past selves
than were participants pursuing accuracy goals. In another
study, Ross and Wilson (2002) found that participants felt
more psychologically distant from past negative experiences,
but they felt psychologically nearer to past positive experi-
ences. By perceiving a past achievement as psychologically
close, people can continue to relish their success and establish
a positive self-image; by perceiving a past failure as psycho-
logically distant, people can dismiss that failure as belonging
to a very different past self. In this way, a positive view of the
self can be cultivated in the present by strategically
interpreting negative past experiences within a life narrative.
When constructing a positive sense of self from autobio-
graphical memories, memories showcasing certain traits
and qualities are presumably more important than others.
Recent evidence suggests that perceiving alterations in an-
other person’s moral traits leads to attributions of greater
personal change for that person than perceiving alterations
in other mental features such as perception, desires, or emo-
tions (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2017). Critically,
people also treat moral traits as defining features of their
own selves (Molouki & Bartels, 2017) – just as they do
when making judgments about the identities of other peo-
ple. More than any other feature of our mental lives, positive
moral traits seem to be the most deeply rooted and causally
central components of the self (Strohminger & Nichols,
2014, 2015; Strohminger, Newman, & Knobe, 2017; De
Freitas et al., 2018).
Despite the now considerable evidence indicating that pos-
itive moral traits are most central to personal identity, there is
little research investigating how remembering moral and im-
moral actions from the personal past creates a morally good
self-image. Most research on morality and the self has utilized
vignettes and hypothetical thought experiments, not actual
memories of personal past experiences. Nevertheless, many
argue that autobiographical memories of one’s own personal
history play a critical role in constructing the self (Conway,
Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009). Some
evidence does suggest that autobiographical memories of im-
moral actions are particularly susceptible to biases and distor-
tions in ways that look favorably on the rememberer
(Escobedo & Adolphs, 2010; Kouchaki & Gino, 2016;
Stanley et al., 2017). In particular, Stanley et al. (2017) found
that participants judged their own moral transgressions from
the distant past to be more morally wrong than their more
recent transgressions. Participants advantageously utilized
time to buttress a belief in personal moral improvement.
This finding is consistent with the notion that people frequent-
ly compare their current selves to their past selves to perceive
personal improvement over time, regardless of whether that
perceived improvement is accurate (D’argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2008; Demiray & Janssen, 2015; Ross & Wilson,
2000; Ryff, 1991; Wilson & Ross, 2003).
If people are especially motivated to view themselves as
morally good, then recollecting their past moral and immoral
behaviors might produce differential perceptions of change in
the self since those events occurred. People might perceive
greater change in the self after recalling their own past immor-
al behaviors relative to moral behaviors, even if objective,
calendar time cannot be readily utilized to produce an impres-
sion of moral improvement over time. By perceiving greater
change and dissimilarity in the self since committing a moral
transgression, people can form an impression of personal mor-
al improvement over time. This, in turn, might foster a posi-
tive, morally good view of the self in the present. Furthermore,
these perceptions of similarity or change in the self after
reflecting on past immoral relative to moral behaviors might
manifest in general and specific ways. More generally, people
might report perceiving greater global change in their selves
after recalling their past moral transgressions relative to their
past morally praiseworthy deeds. More specifically, people
might report perceiving greater positive change in the extent
to which they exemplify particular moral traits (e.g., honesty,
loyalty) over time after recalling their past immoral behaviors
relative to moral behaviors. In four studies, we investigate the
extent to which people perceive change in the self after
recalling moral and immoral behaviors from the personal past.
We hypothesize that people strategically come to perceive
meaningful change in the self after reflecting on their own
immoral behaviors from the past, but that people tend to per-
ceive similarity (lack of change) in the self over time after
Mem Cogn
reflecting on their own moral behaviors from the past. In this
way, people use their autobiographical memories of moral and
immoral actions in complementary ways to forge a morally
good sense of self in the present.
Study 1
In Study 1, we investigated whether people perceive greater
dissimilarity and change in the self after recollecting their own
immoral relative to moral behaviors. We further investigated
whether these perceptions of dissimilarity and change persist
after accounting for when participants report that the events
actually occurred in the past (i.e., objective, calendar time).
Materials and method
Participants One-hundred and ten individuals voluntarily par-
ticipated in this study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT)
for monetary compensation. Participant recruitment was re-
stricted to individuals in the USAwith a prior approval rating
above 85%. Twenty participants were excluded for failing to
provide at least one memory, for recalling an event that oc-
curred more than 10 years ago, or for providing the incorrect
type of memory based on the cue (i.e., a memory of a morally
wrong behavior was provided when the participant was cued
to recall a morally right behavior, or vice versa). As such, data
were analyzed with the remaining 90 participants (Mage =
35.61 years, SD = 10.30, age range = 20–71 years, 33 females,
56 males). All participants reported being fluent English
speakers. Informed consent was obtained from each partici-
pant in accordance with the protocol approved by the Duke
University Campus Institutional Review Board.
Procedure The study was self-paced. Participants were asked
to recall a total of six distinct behaviors, one at a time, from
their personal pasts that occurred within the past 10 years.
Three of these memories involved morally wrong actions
committed by the participant; the other three memories in-
volved morally right actions committed by the participant.
Participants were told that these remembered actions must
have occurred on a particular day in a particular place.
For each remembered behavior, participants described the
event in two to five sentences. They then typed in the month
and year that it occurred, and they selected one of the follow-
ing options to best describe when it occurred: within the past
day, within the past week, within the past two weeks, within
the past month, within the past 2 months, within the past 6
months, within the past year, within the past 2 years, within
the past 5 years, within the past 10 years. As a manipulation
check, participants answered the following: how morally
wrong or morally right was your behavior in this instance?
(1 = very morally wrong, 7 = very morally right). Participants
then answered the following three questions in random order:
as you think about this memory now, do you feel like you are a
different person now than you were then? (1 = definitely no, 7
= definitely yes); as you think about this memory now, do you
feel like you are the same person now that you were then? (1 =
definitely no, 7 = definitely yes); how much have you changed
as a person since this event occurred? (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot).
It is worth noting that these last three questions assess percep-
tions of psychological change over time, not whether the for-
mer self ceased to exist after the creation of a new self
(Starmans & Bloom, 2018). Upon completion of the study,
participants were monetarily compensated for their time.
Data analyses Data were analyzed using R (R Development
Core Team, 2009) with the lme4 software package (Bates,
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Data were fit to linear
mixed-effects models, and subject was included as a random
effect (random intercepts only) in all models. Significance for
fixed effects was assessed using Satterthwaite approximations
to degrees of freedom, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs)
around beta-values were computed using parametric
bootstrapping. Objective time was assessed in two comple-
mentary ways. One objective time variable (hereafter referred
to as timeA) was coded as follows: 0 = within the past day; 1 =
within the past week; 2 = within the past 2 weeks; 3 = within
the past month; 4 = within the past 2 months; 5 = within the
past 6 months; 6 = within the past year; 7 = within the past 2
years; 8 =within the past 5 years; 9 =within the past 10 years.
Similar methods have been implemented to characterize the
actual time that events occurred in the past (e.g., Escobedo &
Adolphs, 2010; Stanley et al., 2017). The other objective time
variable (hereafter referred to as timeB) indicates the number
of months that have passed since the remembered event oc-
curred, starting with remembered events that occurred in the
same month as the experimental session coded as 0. The alpha
level for all statistical tests was set at .05.
Results
Figure 1 depicts means for each variable of interest as a func-
tion of the memory cue (i.e., morally right vs. morally wrong).
An initial linear mixed-effects model was computed to ensure
that the remembered actions generated from the morally
wrong cue were, in fact, judged to be more morally wrong
on the 7-pt scale than the remembered actions generated from
the morally right cue. This expectation was confirmed (b =
3.80, SE = .08, t = 48.80, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.64, 3.95]).
We then investigated the relationship between the cued
morality of the action (binary, fixed factor: morally wrong
vs. morally right) and the extent to which participants judged
themselves to be different people now than they were when
the event occurred. A linear mixed-effects model revealed a
significant effect of the cued morality of the action on the
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extent to which participants believe they are different people
now than they were when the event occurred (b = 1.59, SE =
.14, t = 11.06, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.28, 1.88]). Participants
judged that, when the remembered action occurred, they were
more dissimilar to their current selves for the morally wrong
condition relative to the morally right condition. This effect
held at a similar magnitude even after statistically controlling
for timeA (b = 1.34, SE = .13, t = 10.34, p < .001, 95% CI =
[1.07, 1.60]) and timeB (b = 1.25, SE = .13, t = 9.55, p < .001,
95% CI = [1.01, 1.50]) in separate models (see Supplemental
Materials for full models).
Next, we investigated the relationship between the cued
morality of the action (binary, fixed factor: morally wrong
vs. morally right) and the extent to which participants judged
themselves to be the same people now that they were when the
event occurred. A linear mixed-effects model revealed a sig-
nificant effect of the cued morality of the action on the extent
to which participants believe they are the same people now as
they were when the event occurred (b = -1.72, SE = .14, t = -
12.28, p < .001, 95% CI = [-2.00, -1.45]). Participants judged
that, when the remembered action occurred, they were more
similar to their current selves in the morally right condition
relative to morally wrong condition. This effect held at a sim-
ilar magnitude even after statistically controlling for timeA (b
= -1.48, SE = .13, t = -11.52, p < .001, 95%CI = [-1.74, -1.25])
and timeB (b = -1.37, SE = .13, t = -10.66, p < .001, 95% CI =
[-1.62, -1.12]) in separate models (see Supplemental Materials
for full models).
Finally, we investigated the relationship between the
cued morality of the action (binary, fixed factor: morally
wrong vs. morally right) and the extent to which partici-
pants judged themselves to have changed since the event
occurred. An initial linear mixed-effects model revealed a
significant effect of the cued morality of the action on the
extent of perceived change since the event occurred (b =
1.30, SE = .14, t = 9.38, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.04, 1.60]).
Participants judged that they had changed more since the
remembered morally wrong actions occurred than they
had since the morally right actions occurred. This effect
held at a similar magnitude even after statistically control-
ling for timeA (b = 1.03, SE = .12, t = 8.50, p < .001, 95%
CI = [.78, 1.27]) and timeB (b = .95, SE = .12, t = 7.64, p
< .001, 95% CI = [.72, 1.21]) in separate models (see
Supplemental Materials for full models).1
Discussion
Taken together, the results of Study 1 suggest that after re-
membering their own morally wrong actions from the person-
al past, participants perceive their current selves to be more
dissimilar to those past selves than they do after recollecting
morally right actions; they also perceive themselves to have
undergone greater change since those past transgressions oc-
curred. These effects remained at a similar magnitude even
after statistically controlling for objective, calendar time.
Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to provide further support for
the roles of recalling morally right and wrong actions in
service of fostering a morally good view of the self across
diverse domains of morality. To this end, we investigated
individuals’ perceptions of change in the self over time by
directly comparing memories involving honesty versus
dishonesty, helping versus harming, fairness versus un-
fairness, and loyalty versus disloyalty. We chose these
matched pairs because people report frequently engaging
1 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, we also conducted additional
analyses investigating possible interaction effects between the cued morality
of the remembered behavior and objective time variables. These results are
reported in the Supplemental Materials.
Fig. 1 Means and standard error bars are depicted for the judged morality of the remembered actions, different judgments, same judgments, and change
judgments, all as a function of the memory cue (morally right or morally wrong)
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in morally right and wrong actions within these domains
in everyday life (Hofmann et al., 2014).
Materials and method
Participants One-hundred and ten individuals voluntarily par-
ticipated in this study via AMT for monetary compensation.
Participant recruitment was restricted to individuals in the
USAwith a prior approval rating above 85%. Eleven partici-
pants were excluded for failing to provide at least one mem-
ory, for providing a memory of an event that occurred more
than 10 years ago, or for providing the incorrect type of mem-
ory based on the cue. As such, data were analyzed with the
remaining 99 participants (Mage = 33.78 years, SD = 9.78, age
range = 20–69 years, 47 females, 51 males). All participants
reported being fluent English speakers. Those who participat-
ed in Study 1 were automatically prevented from participating
in Study 2. Informed consent was obtained from each partic-
ipant in accordance with the protocol approved by the Duke
University Campus Institutional Review Board.
ProcedureThe studywas self-paced. Participants were asked to
recall a total of eight distinct actions, one at a time, from their
personal pasts that occurred within the past 10 years.
Participants were provided with a unique cue for each of the
eight memories: (1) recall a specific past experience in which
you were honest with another person, and you believe your
action was morally right; (2) recall a specific past experience
in which you were dishonest with another person, and you
believe your action was morally wrong; (3) recall a specific
past experience in which you helped another person, and you
believe your action was morally right; (4) recall a specific past
experience in which you harmed another person, and you be-
lieve your action was morally wrong; (5) recall a specific past
experience in which you treated another person fairly, and you
believe your action was morally right; (6) recall a specific past
experience in which you treated another person unfairly, and
you believe your action was morally wrong; (7) recall a specific
past experience in which you were loyal to another person, and
you believe your action was morally right; and (8) recall a
specific past experience in which you were disloyal to another
person, and you believe your action was morally wrong. We
randomized the order in which these cues were presented
across participants. This cueing procedure ultimately produced
four distinct matched pairs of remembered actions – one mor-
ally right and the other morally wrong – for each particular kind
of behavior: (1) honesty-dishonesty; (2) helping-harming; (3)
fairness-unfairness; and (4) loyalty-disloyalty.
For each remembered action, participants described the
event in two to five sentences. Participants then reported when
the event occurred (the same two measures used in Study 1
were also used in Study 2). As a manipulation check, partic-
ipants answered the following: howmorally wrong or morally
right was your behavior in this instance? (1 = very morally
wrong, 7 = very morally right). Participants then answered the
following three questions in random order: as you think about
this memory now, do you feel like you are a different person
now than you were then? (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes);
as you think about this memory now, do you feel like you are
the same person now that you were then? (1 = definitely no, 7
= definitely yes); how much have you changed as a person
since this event occurred? (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot). After
completing the study, participants were monetarily compen-
sated for their time.
Data analysesData were analyzed in two ways. First, separate
paired-samples t-tests were computed to investigate mean dif-
ferences in the four outcome variables (i.e., judged morality,
different, same, and change) as a function of memory cue
(morally right vs. morally wrong). Second, using R (R
Development Core Team, 2009) and the lme4 software pack-
age (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), data were fit
to linear mixed-effects models that included the memory cue
as a predictor of the different, same, and change outcome
variables in separate models. TimeA and timeB were included
as controls in separate models (due to multi-collinearity, they
could not both be included in the same model), and subject
was included as a random effect (random intercepts only) in
all models. As in Study 1, significance for fixed effects was
assessed using Satterthwaite approximations to degrees of
freedom, and 95% CIs around beta-values were computed
using parametric bootstrapping. The alpha level for all statis-
tical tests was set at .05.
Results
Four separate paired-samples t-tests were initially computed
to verify that the remembered actions generated from the mor-
ally wrong cue were, in fact, judged to be more morally wrong
than the remembered actions generated from the morally right
cue. Confirming this expectation, remembered actions gener-
ated from the morally wrong cue were rated as more morally
wrong on the 7-pt scale than those generated from the morally
right cue for each matched pair: honesty-dishonesty (Mdiff =
3.75, t(98) = 24.41, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.44, 4.05]), helping-
harming (Mdiff = 4.08, t(98) = 29.06, p < .001, 95%CI = [3.80,
4.36]), fairness-unfairness (Mdiff = 3.82, t(98) = 30.04, p <
.001, 95% CI = [3.57, 4.07]), and loyalty-disloyalty (Mdiff =
3.99, t(98) = 23.70, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.66, 4.32]). All
reported 95% CIs are for mean differences. See Table 1 for
descriptive statistics.
For each matched pair, we investigated the extent to which
participants believed they were different people when they
recalled the event than they were when the event actually
occurred as a function of recalling a morally right or wrong
past action. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants
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felt more dissimilar to their past selves after recalling morally
wrong actions relative to morally right actions for honesty-
dishonesty (Mdiff = 1.21, t(98) = 4.32, p < .001, 95% CI =
[.66, 1.77]), helping-harming (Mdiff = 2.11, t(98) = 7.86, p <
.001, 95% CI = [1.58, 2.64]), fairness-unfairness (Mdiff = 1.99,
t(98) = 7.71, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.48, 2.50]), and loyalty-
disloyalty (Mdiff = 1.28, t(98) = 4.48, p < .001, 95% CI = [.71,
1.85]). See Table 1. Subsequent LMERs were then computed,
each with the cued morality of the past action (morally wrong
vs. morally right) predicting the extent to which participants
believed they were different people now than they were when
the event actually occurred, all while statistically controlling
for when the past experiences actually occurred. For each
remembered pair of events, participants felt more dissimilar
to their past selves in the morally wrong condition relative to
the morally right condition, even after statistically controlling
for timeA and timeB in separate models (all ps < .001; see
Supplemental Materials for full models).
Next, for each matched pair, we investigated the extent to
which participants believed they were the same people upon
recalling the event as they were when the event actually oc-
curred as a function of recalling a morally right or wrong past
behavior. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants
were more likely to feel the same as their past selves after
recalling morally right actions relative to morally wrong ac-
tions for honesty-dishonesty (Mdiff = 1.23, t(98) = 4.42, p <
.001, 95% CI = [.68, 1.79]), helping-harming (Mdiff = 2.36,
t(98) = 9.25, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.86, 2.87]), fairness-
unfairness (Mdiff = 1.96, t(98) = 7.63, p < .001, 95% CI =
[1.45, 2.47]), and loyalty-disloyalty (Mdiff = 1.39, t(98) =
4.99, p < .001, 95% CI = [.84, 1.95]). See Table 1.
Subsequent LMERs were then computed, each with the cued
morality of the past action (morally wrong vs. morally right)
predicting the extent to which participants believed they were
the same people now that they were when the event occurred,
all while statistically controlling for when these past experi-
ences actually occurred. For each remembered pair of events,
participants were more likely to feel the same as their past
selves in the morally right condition relative to the morally
wrong condition, even after statistically controlling for timeA
and timeB in separate models (all ps < .001; see Supplemental
Materials for full models).
Finally, for each matched pair, we investigated how much
participants believed they had changed since the remembered
event occurred as a function of whether a morally right or
wrong past action was recalled. Paired-samples t-tests re-
vealed that participants believed that they had changed more
since the remembered event occurred after recalling morally
wrong actions relative to morally right actions for honesty-
dishonesty (Mdiff = .99, t(98) = 3.59, p = .001, 95% CI =
[.44, 1.54]), helping-harming (Mdiff = 1.98, t(98) = 7.61, p <
.001, 95% CI = [1.46, 2.50]), fairness-unfairness (Mdiff = 1.55,
t(98) = 6.26, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.06, 2.04]), and loyalty-
disloyalty (Mdiff = 1.10, t(98) = 3.90, p < .001, 95% CI = [.54,
1.66]). See Table 1. Subsequent LMERs were then computed,
each with the cued morality of the past action (morally wrong
vs. morally right) predicting the extent to which participants
believed they had changed since the remembered event oc-
curred, all while statistically controlling for when these past
experiences actually occurred. For each remembered pair of
events, participants reported that they had changed more since
the remembered events occurred in the morally wrong condi-
tion relative to the morally right condition, even after statisti-
cally controlling for timeA and timeB in separate models (all ps
< .004; see Supplemental Materials for full models).2
Discussion
The results from Study 2 corroborate and extend our findings
from Study 1. As in Study 1, we found that after recalling their
ownmorally wrong actions from the personal past, individuals
perceived greater change and dissimilarity in the self since the
events occurred than they did after recalling their own morally
right actions. This pattern of results was obtained for each
matched pair: honesty versus dishonesty, helping versus
harming, fairness versus unfairness, and loyalty versus disloy-
alty. In all cases, these effects remained even after statistically
controlling for objective, calendar time.
Study 3
The results from Studies 1 and 2 provide some evidence that
recollecting past immoral actions is associated with stronger
feelings of dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over
time than remembering past moral actions. Building upon our
2 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, we also conducted additional
analyses investigating possible interaction effects between the cued morality
of the remembered behavior and objective time variables. These results are
reported in Supplemental Materials.
Table 1 Summary of means (SDs) for each measured variable as a
function of memory cue
Memory cue Judged Morality Different Same Change
Honesty 6.05 (0.81) 2.97 (1.98) 5.16 (1.92) 3.08 (2.02)
Dishonesty 2.30 (1.14) 4.18 (2.18) 3.93 (2.15) 4.07 (2.12)
Helping 6.27 (0.75) 2.39 (1.78) 5.91 (1.65) 2.51 (1.81)
Harming 2.19 (1.08) 4.49 (2.10) 3.55 (2.05) 4.48 (2.12)
Fairness 6.11 (0.87) 2.53 (1.79) 5.56 (1.69) 2.59 (1.74)
Unfairness 2.29 (0.80) 4.52 (2.07) 3.60 (2.04) 4.13 (2.01)
Loyalty 6.20 (0.94) 3.08 (1.92) 5.07 (1.84) 3.28 (1.86)
Disloyalty 2.21 (1.04) 4.36 (2.08) 3.68 (2.08) 4.38 (2.11)
Note. 7-pt scales were used for all four measured variables
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findings in Studies 1 and 2, the purpose of Study 3 is twofold.
First, the within-subjects design in the previous studies could
have created a demand characteristic: participants might have
assumed that the experimenter wanted them to answer the
outcome measures differently for remembered morally wrong
versus morally right behaviors. To circumvent this issue,
Study 3 implements a between-subjects design. Second, the
effects in Study 1 could have been produced by some other
process related to how people are perceived more generally,
rather than a motivational process about the self. In order to
provide more direct support for the explanation that these
effects resulted from a motivational process about the self,
an additional condition was included: some participants were
asked to provide memories of witnessing other people commit
morally right or wrong actions. If the difference between mor-
ally right and wrong conditions in different, same, and change
measures is exclusive to memories about the self committing
morally right and wrong actions, then the explanation for our
pattern of results is likely motivational.
Materials and method
Participants Two-hundred and sixty individuals voluntarily
participated in this study via AMT for monetary compensa-
tion. Participant recruitment was restricted to individuals in
the USA who had completed at least 50 HITs on AMT and
had obtained an approval rating above 85%. Twenty-two par-
ticipants were excluded for failing to provide at least one
memory, for recalling an event that occurred more than 10
years ago, or for providing the incorrect type of memory based
on the cue. As such, data were analyzed with the remaining
238 participants (Mage = 36.26 years, SD = 10.51, age range =
18–70 years, 118 females, 119 males). All participants report-
ed being fluent English speakers. Those who participated in
the previous studies were prevented from participating in this
study. Informed consent was obtained from each participant in
accordance with the protocol approved by the Duke
University Campus Institutional Review Board.
Procedure The study was self-paced.Wemanipulated both the
nature of the remembered behavior (morally wrong vs. mor-
ally right) and the person who committed the act (self vs.
other). Participants were randomly assigned to one of these
four conditions in a between-subjects fashion: (1) participants
recalled three morally right behaviors that they themselves
committed, (2) three morally wrong behaviors that they them-
selves committed, (3) threemorally right behaviors committed
by another person, or (4) three morally wrong behaviors com-
mitted by another person. Participants were told that these
remembered actions must have occurred within the past 10
years on a particular day in a particular place.
For each remembered behavior, participants described the
event in two to five sentences. Participants then reported when
the event occurred (the same two measures used in Studies 1
and 2 were also used in Study 3). As a manipulation check,
participants answered the following: how morally wrong or
morally right was the remembered behavior in this instance?
(1 = very morally wrong, 7 = very morally right). Participants
then answered the different, same, and change questions in a
random order. Different, same, and change judgments were
always made about the individual who behaved morally or
immorally. Upon completion of the study, participants were
monetarily compensated for their time.
Data analyses Using R (R Development Core Team, 2009)
and the lme4 software package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2015), data were fit to linear mixed-effects models.
Fixed effects and outcome variables differed depending upon
the model, but subject was included as a random effect (ran-
dom intercepts only) in all models. TimeA and timeB were
included as controls in separate models (due to multi-collin-
earity, they could not both be included in the same model). As
in previous studies, significance for fixed effects was assessed
using Satterthwaite approximations to degrees of freedom,
and 95% CIs around beta-values were computed using para-
metric bootstrapping. The alpha level for all statistical tests
was set at .05.
Results
An initial linear mixed-effects model was computed to ensure
that the remembered actions generated from the morally
wrong cue were, in fact, judged to be more morally wrong
on the 7-pt scale than the remembered actions generated from
the morally right cue. This expectation was confirmed (b =
3.36, SE = .16, t = 21.45, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.04, 3.68]).
We investigated the effects of the cued morality of the
action (binary, fixed factor: morally wrong vs. morally right)
and the person who committed the action (binary, fixed factor:
self vs. other) on different, same, and change judgments in
separate linear mixed-effects models. The interaction between
the cued morality of the action (morally wrong coded as 1,
morally right coded as 0) and the person committing the action
(self coded as 1, other coded as 0) was significant for all three
different outcome variables (i.e., different, same, and change;
all ps < .005). Table 2 depicts full results from these three
models.
To further interrogate these interaction effects, we comput-
ed follow-up linear mixed-effects models for self and other
conditions taken separately. In the self condition, there was a
significant effect of the cued morality of the action on the
extent to which people believe they are different now relative
to who they were when the event occurred (b = 1.43, SE = .30,
t = 4.71, p < .001, 95% CI = [.81, 2.00]), the extent to which
people believe they are the same now relative to who they
were when the event occurred (b = -1.27, SE = .27, t = -
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4.76, p < .001, 95%CI = [-1.83, -.76]), and the extent to which
they believe they have changed since the event occurred (b =
1.05, SE = .32, t = 3.26, p = .001, 95% CI = [.50, 1.67]; see
Fig. 2). When participants recalled their own morally wrong
actions relative to their own morally right actions, they judged
themselves to be more dissimilar to their past selves who
committed the actions and they judged themselves to have
changed more since the event occurred. These effects
persisted at a similar magnitude even after statistically control-
ling for timeA and timeB in separate models (all ps < .004; see
Supplemental Materials for full models).
In the other condition, linear mixed-effects models re-
vealed no significant effects of the cued morality of the action
on different (b = -17, SE = .31, t = -.55, p = .58, 95% CI =
[-.80, .51]), same (b = -.19, SE = .28, t = -.67, p = .51, 95% CI
= [-.77, .36]), or change (b = -.21, SE = .32, t = -.66, p = .51,
95% CI = [-.83, .42]) judgments. So, the effect of recalling
morally wrong versus morally right actions on different, same,
and change judgments are evident in the self but not in the
other condition.
Discussion
The pattern of results from Studies 1 and 2 was replicated in
Study 3 using a between-subjects design instead of a within-
subjects design. That is, participants’ recollections of their
own past immoral actions were accompanied by stronger feel-
ings of dissimilarity and change in the self over time relative to
recollections of their own past moral actions. This effect
persisted even after statistically controlling for objective, cal-
endar time. Study 3 also provides more direct support for a
motivational explanation for our pattern of results that is about
the self. Participants perceived greater change and dissimilar-
ity in their selves after recalling their own past moral
transgressions relative to their own past morally praiseworthy
deeds, but there were no significant differences between re-
membered morally right and wrong actions committed by
other people.
Study 4
In the previous three studies, we found that people report
perceiving greater change and dissimilarity in their selves after
recalling their own past immoral behaviors relative to moral
behaviors. In Study 4, we investigate whether people specifi-
cally report greater positive change in particular moral traits
(e.g., honesty, loyalty) over time after recollecting their past
immoral behavior relative to moral behaviors. While recalling
an immoral behavior from the personal past in which they
were dishonest, participants might be motivated to believe
they are more honest now than they were when the event
occurred. By believing that they have become more honest
since they acted dishonestly, they can still foster a positive
view of the current self as morally good by perceiving their
moral improvement over time. In contrast, after recalling a
morally good behavior from the personal past in which they
were honest, there would be no motivation to perceive posi-
tive change since the event occurred. We further expect that
the perceived changes in the possession of particular moral
traits after recalling morally right versus wrong past behaviors
will remain after accounting for variance attributable to objec-
tive, calendar time.
Materials and method
Participants Eight-hundred and sixty individuals voluntar-
ily participated in this study via AMT for monetary
Table 2 The results of three different linear mixed-effects models with the cuedmorality and the person committing the action as predictors of different,
same, and change judgments, respectively
b SE t-value p-value 95% CI
Outcome: Different
Cued Morality -.18 .29 -.60 .55 [.77, .41]
Person Committing the Action -.53 .31 -1.73 .08 [-1.16, .06]
Cued Morality × Person Committing the Action 1.63 .43 3.76 < .001 [.82, 2.45]
Outcome: Same
Cued Morality -.12 .26 -.46 .65 [-.66, .40]
Person Committing the Action .43 .27 1.55 .12 [-.14, .94]
Cued Morality × Person Committing the Action -1.13 .39 -2.93 .004 [-1.87, -.35]
Outcome: Change
Cued Morality -.26 .31 -.85 .39 [-.86, .40]
Person Committing the Action -.20 .32 -.63 .53 [-.98, .45]
Cued Morality × Person Committing the Action 1.31 .45 2.89 .004 [.34, 2.33]
Note. All 95% CIs are for the beta-estimates
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compensation. Participant recruitment was restricted to
individuals in the USA who had completed at least 50
HITs on AMT and had obtained an approval rating
above 85%. Fifty-six participants were excluded for fail-
ing to provide at least one memory, for providing a
memory of an event that occurred more than 10 years
ago, or for providing the incorrect type of memory
based on the cue. As such, data were analyzed with
the remaining 804 participants (Mage = 34.68 years,
SD = 10.78, age range = 19–86 years, 322 females,
480 males). All participants reported being fluent
English speakers. Those who participated in any of the
previous studies were automatically prevented from par-
ticipating in Study 4. Informed consent was obtained
from each participant in accordance with the protocol
approved by the Duke University Campus Institutional
Review Board.
Procedure The study was self-paced. Participants were asked
to recall one event from the personal past that occurred within
the past 10 years. There were eight different conditions to
which participants were randomly assigned in a between-
subjects fashion: (1) recall a specific past experience in which
you were honest with another person, and you believe your
action was morally right; (2) recall a specific past experience
in which you were dishonest with another person, and you
believe your action was morally wrong; (3) recall a specific
past experience in which you helped another person, and you
believe your action was morally right; (4) recall a specific past
experience in which you harmed another person, and you
believe your action was morally wrong; (5) recall a specific
past experience in which you treated another person fairly, and
you believe your action was morally right; (6) recall a specific
past experience in which you treated another person unfairly,
and you believe your action was morally wrong; (7) recall a
specific past experience in which you were loyal to another
person, and you believe your action was morally right; and (8)
recall a specific past experience in which you were disloyal to
another person, and you believe your action was morally
wrong. As in Study 2, this cueing procedure ultimately pro-
duced four distinct matched pairs of remembered actions –
one morally right and the other morally wrong – for each
Fig. 2 For the self (a) and other (b) conditions, means and standard error bars are depicted for the judged morality of the remembered actions, different
judgments, same judgments, and change judgments, all as a function of the memory cue (morally right or morally wrong)
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particular kind of behavior: (1) honesty-dishonesty; (2)
helping-harming; (3) fairness-unfairness; and (4) loyalty-dis-
loyalty. However, unlike Study 2, all comparisons between
matched pairs of remembered actions were between-subjects.
After recalling an event from the personal past, participants
described the event in two to five sentences. Participants then
reported when the event occurred (the same two measures
used in the three previous studies were also used in Study
4). As a manipulation check, participants answered the follow-
ing: howmorally wrong or morally right was your behavior in
this instance? (1 = very morally wrong, 7 = very morally
right). For our outcome variables of interest, participants
made one of four different ratings depending upon the partic-
ular kind of behavior remembered. Participants who recalled
an event involving honesty or dishonesty answered the fol-
lowing question: do you believe you are a more honest person
now than the person you were when this event occurred? (1 =
definitely no, 7 = definitely yes). Participants who recalled an
event involving helping or harming answered the following
question: do you believe you are a more helpful person now
than the person you were when this event occurred? (1 =
definitely no, 7 = definitely yes). Participants who recalled an
event involving fairness or unfairness answered the following
question: do you believe you are a more fair person now than
the person you were when this event occurred? (1 = definitely
no, 7 = definitely yes). And participants who recalled an event
involving loyalty or disloyalty answered the following ques-
tion: do you believe you are a more loyal person now than the
person you were when this event occurred? (1 = definitely no,
7 = definitely yes). All participants also answered the follow-
ing questions about the phenomenology of their memories:
how detailed is your memory of this event? (1 = not at all
detailed, 7 = very detailed); how vivid is your memory of this
event? (1 = very vague, 7 = very vivid); how clear is your
memory of this event (1 = very unclear, 7 = very clear).
These phenomenology measures were included to help con-
ceal the purpose of the study. After completing the study,
participants were monetarily compensated for their time.
Data analyses Data were analyzed in two ways. First, sep-
arate independent-samples t-tests were computed to inves-
tigate mean differences in the outcome variables (i.e., per-
ceived changes in honesty, helpfulness, fairness, and loy-
alty since the remembered event occurred) as a function
of memory cue (morally right vs. morally wrong).
Second, data were fit to regression models that included
the memory cue (morally wrong coded as 1, morally right
coded as 0) as a predictor of perceived changes in hones-
ty, helpfulness, fairness, and loyalty in separate models.
TimeA and timeB were then included as controls in sepa-
rate regression models (due to multi-collinearity, they
could not both be included in the same model). The alpha
level for all statistical tests was set at .05.
Results
Four separate independent-samples t-tests were initially com-
puted to verify that the remembered actions generated from
the morally wrong cue were, in fact, judged to be more mor-
ally wrong than the remembered actions generated from the
morally right cue. Confirming this expectation, remembered
actions generated from the morally wrong cue were rated as
more morally wrong on the 7-pt scale than those generated
from the morally right cue for each matched pair: honesty-
dishonesty (n = 199, Mdiff = 3.62, t(197) = 22.34, p < .001,
95% CI = [3.30, 3.94]), helping-harming (n = 197, Mdiff =
3.95, t(195) = 25.58, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.65, 4.26]),
fairness-unfairness (n = 203, Mdiff = 3.51, t(201) = 22.51, p
< .001, 95% CI = [3.21, 3.82]), and loyalty-disloyalty (n =
205, Mdiff = 3.73, t(203) = 20.49, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.37,
3.38]). All reported 95% CIs are for mean differences.
Honesty-dishonesty For memories involving honesty and
dishonesty, we investigated the effect of the cued morality
of the action (morally wrong vs. morally right) on the
extent to which participants judged themselves to be more
honest at the time of recalling the event than they were
when the event actually occurred. Relative to participants
cued to provide a memory of a morally right, honest be-
havior (M = 4.27, SD = 1.72), those participants cued to
provide a memory of a morally wrong, dishonest behavior
(M = 4.80, SD = 1.79) judged themselves to be more
honest at the time of recalling the event than they were
when the event actually occurred (n = 199, Mdiff = .53,
t(197) = 2.13, p = .028, 95% CI = [.04, 1.02]). This effect
remained at a similar magnitude even after statistically
controlling for timeA and timeB in separate regression
models (both ps < .05; see Supplemental Materials for
full models).
Helping-harming For memories involving helping and
harming, we investigated the effect of the cued morality
of the action (morally wrong versus morally right) on the
extent to which participants judged themselves to be
more helpful at the time of recalling the event than they
were when the event actually occurred. Relative to par-
ticipants cued to provide a memory of a morally right,
helpful behavior (M = 4.68, SD = 1.57), those partici-
pants cued to provide a memory of a morally wrong,
harmful behavior (M = 5.21, SD = 1.65) judged them-
selves to be more helpful at the time of recalling the
event than they were when the event actually occurred
(n = 197, Mdiff = .53, t(195) = 2.30, p = .022, 95% CI =
[.08, .98]). However, this effect was rendered non-
significant after statistically controlling for timeA (p =
.052) and timeB (p > .10) in separate regression models
(see Supplemental Materials for full models).
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Fairness-unfairness For memories involving fairness and un-
fairness, we investigated the effect of the cued morality of the
action (morally wrong vs. morally right) on the extent to which
participants judged themselves to be more fair at the time of
recalling the event than they were when the event actually
occurred. Relative to participants cued to provide a memory
of a morally right, fair behavior (M = 4.33, SD = 1.66), those
participants cued to provide a memory of a morally wrong,
unfair behavior (M = 5.11, SD = 1.74) judged themselves to
be more fair at the time of recalling the event than they were
when the event actually occurred (n = 203,Mdiff = .78, t(201) =
3.25, p = .001, 95% CI = [.31, 1.25]). This effect remained at a
similar magnitude even after statistically controlling for timeA
and timeB in separate regression models (both ps < .006; see
Supplemental Materials for full models).
Loyalty-disloyalty For memories involving loyalty and disloy-
alty, we investigated the effect of the cued morality of the
action (morally wrong vs. morally right) on the extent to
which participants judged themselves to be more loyal at the
time of recalling the event than they were when the event
actually occurred. Relative to participants cued to provide a
memory of a morally right, loyal behavior (M = 4.56, SD =
1.66), those participants cued to provide a memory of a mor-
ally wrong, disloyal behavior (M = 5.16, SD = 1.72) judged
themselves to be more loyal at the time of recalling the event
than they were when the event actually occurred (n = 205,
Mdiff = .61, t(203) = 2.56, p = .011, 95% CI = [.14, 1.07]).
This effect remained at a similar magnitude even after statis-
tically controlling for timeA and timeB in separate regression
models (both ps < .03; see Supplemental Materials for full
models).
Discussion
Overall, the results from Study 4 indicate that people report
greater positive change in particular moral traits over time
after recalling their past immoral relative to moral behaviors.
This effect was obtained for all four moral traits investigated:
honesty, helpfulness, fairness, and loyalty. After recollecting
memories of morally wrong behaviors, there seems to be a
motivation to perceive positive change in the self since the
events occurred. That is, to counteract a threat to a morally
good view of self, participants tend to perceive positive
change over time in the extent to which they possess moral
traits. In contrast, after recollecting their morally right behav-
iors, there is no need to perceivemoral improvement over time
in service of repairing a negative view of the self.
Furthermore, for memories involving honesty-dishonesty,
fairness-unfairness, and loyalty-disloyalty, the perceived
changes in the possession of these moral traits (after recalling
morally right versus wrong past events) remained at a similar
magnitude even after statistically controlling for objective,
calendar time. So, regardless of how long ago the event actu-
ally occurred, people still perceived meaningful, positive psy-
chological change in the self.
General discussion
Autobiographical memories are not literal records of what has
occurred in the personal past (Conway, 2005; D’Argembeau
& Van der Linden, 2008; Schacter, 1999; Schacter, Guerin, &
St. Jacques, 2011). Current motivations affect which personal
past experiences are recalled, how those events are recon-
structed, and how those events are interpreted within a life
narrative. In four studies, we found consistent evidence for a
particularly strong bias in how past experiences are exploited
to foster a positive moral self-image. After recollecting their
own moral transgressions from the personal past, participants
reported feeling dissimilar to their past selves and perceiving
significant change in the self since those events occurred. In
contrast, after recalling their own morally praiseworthy past
actions, participants reported feeling more similar to those
past selves and perceiving less change in the self since those
events occurred. Not only did these effects hold for diverse
domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty, helping/
harming, fairness/unfairness, and loyalty/disloyalty), but they
also persisted after statistically controlling for when the events
actually occurred in the past (objective, calendar time).
Supporting a motivational explanation, we consistently found
effects of recalling morally right versus wrong actions on
judgments of change over time when those past actions were
committed by the participants themselves; however, there
were no significant effects when participants recalled morally
right and wrong actions committed by other people.
Overall, the current findings support our hypothesis that
people strategically construct a positive, morally good sense
of self in the present (1) by perceiving similarity in the self
after reflecting on their own morally praiseworthy actions
from the past and (2) by perceiving meaningful change or
transformation in the self after reflecting on their own immoral
actions from the past. Moreover, these perceptions of similar-
ity and change in the self after recollecting past moral and
immoral behaviors manifested in both general and specific
ways. More generally, participants reported perceiving greater
global change and dissimilarity in their selves after recalling
their past moral transgressions relative to their past morally
praiseworthy deeds (Studies 1–3). More specifically, partici-
pants reported perceiving greater positive change in the extent
to which they exemplified particular moral traits (e.g., hones-
ty, loyalty) over time after recalling their past immoral relative
tomoral behaviors (Study 4). These results add to a substantial
literature suggesting that the ways in which we remember and
interpret our past experiences serve self-enhancement and
self-protective functions (Leary, 2007; Wilson & Ross,
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2003). For example, people tend to believe they have under-
gone personal improvement over time to a greater extent than
other people (Wilson & Ross 2001), people tend to take great-
er personal responsibility for their own past successes than
their own past failures (Blaine & Crocker 1993), and people
are more likely to engage in self-enhancing deceptions involv-
ing their current selves than their past selves (Robinson &
Ryff, 1999). Going beyond this existing literature, our find-
ings suggest that how we remember and interpret our past
experiences helps to construct a current sense of self that is
not just positive but also morally good. This result is particu-
larly important because moral traits and characteristics are
considered to be the most important, fundamental, or central
part of personal identity, or the self (Chen, Urminsky, &
Bartels, 2016; De Freitas et al., 2017; Molouki & Bartels,
2017; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; Strohminger et al.,
2017).
Philosophers and psychologists have used the terms Bself^
and Bidentity^ in several distinct ways. For our purposes, there
are at least two ways of thinking about the self, or personal
identity, that are worth differentiating: (1) numerical identity is
the sense in which a single thing persists over time and (2)
qualitative identity refers to the sharing of particular properties
over time (Starmans & Bloom, 2018). In assessing numerical
identity, we might say that infant Neil Armstrong is, for ex-
ample, identical to adult Neil Armstrong. But in assessing
qualitative identity over time, we might say that Neil
Armstrong prior to walking on the moon is dissimilar to, or
not the same as, Neil Armstrong after walking on the moon,
because walking on the moon must be a particularly transfor-
mative experience. As in our previous work (Stanley et al.,
2017), we believe that the current findings specifically inform
individuals’ judgments about qualitative identity over time.
That is, in one sense, a given person is still the same person
before and after committing a serious moral transgression, so
numerical identity remains fixed over time. But, in another
sense, after reflecting on a particular moral transgression sev-
eral months later, a person might report feeling very different
from his past self or feeling as though he has undergone sig-
nificant change since that remembered transgression occurred;
so, qualitative identity changes in meaningful, predictable,
and systematic ways over time.
Almost all existing research on morality and the self has
utilized stylized vignettes, not actual memories of personal
past experiences. Although this existing research has pro-
duced valuable insights into the relationship between morality
and the self, we suggest that investigating autobiographical
memories of moral and immoral behaviors that actually oc-
curred in the past is necessary for obtaining a complete picture
of how people construct and understand their moral selves. By
remembering and reflecting on events from the personal past,
we come to construct and understand who we believe our-
selves to be in the present (Conway, 2005; McAdams, 2013;
Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009). Biases, distortions, and moti-
vations in how we remember our personal pasts play critical
roles in how we view our selves in the present, and these
biases, distortions, and motivation are unlikely to play a role
in vignette-based investigations of morality and the self.
There are positive consequences of viewing the self accu-
rately and truthfully, even if that that view of the self isn’t
particularly flattering. Maintaining an accurate, truthful view
of the self can facilitate sensible future planning, enable goal
success, and cultivate personal and social well-being (Strube,
1990; Trope, 1986). Nevertheless, converging lines of evi-
dence now indicate that enhancing or protecting a positive
view of the self is frequently pursued at the expense of
obtaining an accurate, truthful view of the self. Of course,
views of the self do not always have to be veridical to posi-
tively affect intentions and behavior: an unrealistically favor-
able self-view induces feelings of efficacy and a willingness to
engage in decisive action (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, &
McDowell, 2003). But sometimes there are significant costs
that accompany an overriding desire view the self in a positive
way. In the moral domain, people seem particularly suscepti-
ble to forgetting, dismissing, or post hoc justifying their own
moral transgressions for the sake of maintaining a positive, but
inaccurate, view of the self as morally upstanding. Many peo-
ple who consider themselves to be morally upstanding still
cheat, steal, lie, deceive, and harm others. In fact, utilizing
ecological momentary assessment, Hofmann et al. (2014) re-
cently showed that people behave immorally with surprising
frequency. Moral transgressions, even those that are relatively
minor, often have deleterious social and financial conse-
quences (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, &
Ayal, 2015). An important goal of our future research will be
to develop strategies for encouraging people to develop accu-
rate, truthful views of the moral self, specifically in those
contexts where accurate, truthful views of the moral self are
better suited to impact intentions and behavior in a positive
way.
Finally, it is worth mentioning a possible alternative inter-
pretation of our results. Because the tasks we employed
instructed participants to recall moral and immoral autobio-
graphical memories, it is possible that reported impressions of
change (or lack thereof) in the self across time simply reflect
the extent to which they embrace or disavow the remembered
action. As such, our results may reflect participants’ feelings
toward the remembered action rather than a definitive percep-
tion of change or sameness in the self across time.3 The prob-
lem with this alternative account is that it is not clear whether
embracing or disavowing a remembered action is independent
of, or even explanatorily prior to, a person’s perception of
change in the self over time. Do we disavow immoral actions
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative
interpretation.
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because we feel that we are different than we were before, or
do we feel that we are different than we were before because
we disavow such immoral actions? It is reasonable to think
that people are as motivated to disavow a past immoral action
because, upon reflection, they do not think of themselves as
the same person who committed it, as they are to think of
themselves as a different person than they were before pre-
cisely because they are motivated to disavow the remembered
action. If these two explanations are truly distinct, then it is an
empirical question to uncover right order of explanation. This,
we think, is another fruitful avenue for future research on the
self and moral memories.
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